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There is no single answer to the question 'how far back?' and the legal community 
needs to identify the appropriate cases and provide the compelling arguments that 
will lead to the just result.
N early every person probably has heard the adage 'where there is a right, there is a remedy' (ubi jus ibi remedium), a phrase which suggests that the 
very notion of a right is inextricable from having an 
enforceable claim. (See in general, Dinah Shelton's, 
Reparations in International Human Rights Law (OUP, 1999)). 
The international law of human rights certainly lists the 
right to a remedy as one of the rights to be guaranteed in 
national law. If no domestic remedy is afforded because of 
lack of access to a competent forum or lack of a basis for 
reparations in substantive law, a growing number of 
international procedures allow claims to be brought 
against the state that committed the wrong.
The issue of reparations for human rights violations has 
drawn increasing interest in recent years. The UN has 
studied the problem, appointing a series of special 
rapporteurs to study aspects of the issue. The Durban 
World Conference on Racism organised by the Unitedo j
Nations took up the topic. The transitions from repressive 
to democratic regimes across the continents (South Africa, 
Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, Asia) have led
successor regimes into difficult discussions with the&
survivors of human rights violations about the appropriate 
means to deal with the past. Unresolved claims from the 
Second World War continue to emerge, while ethnic 
conflicts demonstrate the dangers of leaving such claimso o
unresolved with the hope that they will be forgotten. There 
are many ways to categorise reparations claims. I suggest 
three main divisions:
1. Individual claims. One person is wrongfully arrested and 
detained; a single factory is illegally confiscated; an 
individual is prosecuted under a law that conflicts with 
the state's human rights obligations. These are the 
cases taken to Strasbourg, or to the Inter-American
Commission and Court, or to one of several UN 
bodies.
2. Gross and systematic violations. The language is that of the 
UN, designating a level of violations that can be 
deemed a breach of the United Nations Charter. These 
are serious and widespread occurrences in a state: 
racial segregation in the US or apartheid in South 
Africa; forced disappearances in Honduras and 
Argentina; systematic torture in Chile; arbitrary 
executions in the Philippines; all of the above in some 
States.
3. Historic injustices. These are claims that pre-date the 
international law of human rights, in some cases 
stemming from acts that took place centuries ago.o r o
Genocide of indigenous groups in many parts of the 
Western Hemisphere; brutality during wartime; 
slavery; religious persecution; the sacking of 
Constantinople by the crusaders or the burning of the 
library of Alexandria by the Romans.
All three categories have some elements in common: a 
perceived wrong or injustice for which the victims, 
survivors or descendants seek redress. But the reality is 
very different when examined more closely.
In international law, reparation for human rights 
violations is a sub-category of the law of state 
responsibility. According to this body of law, every breach 
of an international obligation automatically gives rise to a 
duty to make full reparation, by restitution if possible and 
by compensation and/or satisfaction if restitution is not 
possible. The recently completed articles on the law of 
state responsibility make clear this objective. The goals are 
to bring the offending state into compliance with the law 
and to provide compensatory justice to the injured party. 
Although the rules were drafted for the inter-State
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context, there is language in them stating that they are 
'without prejudice' to the obligations that may be owed to 
non-State actors.
What are the problems?
1. Any international duty to afford reparations depends 
upon there being a breach of law and generally law is 
not retroactive. Thus, the European Court of Human 
Rights does not apply to events that occurred before 
the date of its entry into force (3 September 1953). 
Nor can complaints be brought against acts of a State 
that were committed before the State became a party 
to the Convention. Of course, the now-accepted idea 
of 'continuing violations' that applies in the case of 
disappearances, for example, offers some ability to 
reach back in time.
2. Reparations are purely compensatory neither 
exemplary nor punitive. For purely dignitary harms 
like canceling an election and depriving a people of 
democratic government, there are no assessable 
damages. Alternative remedies must be sought.
3. In the absence of a global court of human rights, the 
existing commissions and committees may make 
recommendations to the state concerned about 
appropriate redress, but they may not order remedies.
4. The problem of gross and systematic violations is that 
the sheer number of violations is too big to make full 
reparations available to every victim. One study 
estimates that 170 million died from human rights 
violations during the twentieth century compared to 
33 million in military conflicts. A choice must be made 
between speed and simplicity of procedure and 
individualized justice. Various methods have been 
adapted from one state to another and none are really 
satisfactory. States attempt, some with more good faith 
than others, to allocate losses fairly and repair the harm 
caused, using one or more of the techniques of 
prosecution, rehabilitation, compensation, symbolic 
redress and lustration? Debate continues over the 
question of the scope of international obligations in 
these cases.
5. Historic injustices. The heart of the current issues lies 
in the question 'how far back'? An easy answer is 'only 
as far as the law goes'. If the act was lawful when done,o '
then no reparations are due. But this may be too easy 
an answer.
THE PROBLEM OF HISTORIC INJUSTICES
The Secretary-General Kofi Annan of the United 
Nations has recently commented at the Durban 
Conference on the link between the past and the present:
'Sometimes (today's) problems are in part the legacy of 
terrible wrongs in the past   such as the exploitation and 
extermination of indigenous peoples by colonial Powers, or the
treatment ojmillions of human beings as mere merchandise, 
to be transported and disposed of by other human beings Jor 
commercial gain. The further those events recede into the 
past, the harder it becomes to trace lines of accountability. Yet 
the effects remain. The pain and anger are stillJelt. The 
dead, through their descendants, cry out Jor justice. Tracing a 
connection with past crimes may not always be the most 
constructive way to redress present inequalities, in material 
terms. But man does not live by bread alone. The sense of 
continuity with the past is an integral part of each man's or 
each woman's identity. Some historical wrongs are traceable 
to individuals who are still alive, or corporations that are still 
in business. They must expect to be held to account. The 
society they have wronged mayjorgive them, as part of the 
process of reconciliation, but they cannot demand Jorgiveness 
as of right. Far more difficult are the cases where individual 
profit and loss have been obscured by a myriad of other, more 
recent transactions, yet there is still continuity between the 
societies and states oj today and those that committed the 
original crimes. Each of us has an obligation to consider 
where he or she belongs in this complex historical chain. It is 
always easier to think of the wrongs one 5 own society has 
suffered. It is less comfortable to think in what ways our own 
goodjbrtune might relate to the sufferings &f others, in the 
past or present. But if we are sincere in our desire to overcome 
the conflicts of the past, all of us should make that mental 
effort. '
(Report of the World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, 
Durban, 31 August - 8 September 2001. A/CONF. 189/12 
(Part III) Annex II at 7).
He added: 'We have seen; in recent decades, some 
striking examples of national leaders assuming this 
responsibility, acknowledging past wrongs and asking 
pardon from   or offering an apology to   the victims and 
their heirs. Such gestures cannot right the wrongs of theo o o
past. They can sometimes help to free the present   and 
the future from the shackles of the past.
RECENT CASES
News reports and law journals in recent years have 
reported numerous claims made by groups seeking 
reparation for historic injustices, including Holocaust 
claims, radiation exposure cases, the 'lost generation' of 
forcibly removed aboriginal children in Australia, Japanese 
from Latin American interned in the U S during Worldo
War II. For specific cases see for example Princz v Federal 
Republic of Germany, 26 F. 3d 1166 (D.C. Cir.1994); 
Sampson v Federal Republic of Germany, No.96 C 6242, 1997 
WL 583069 (N.D. 111. 1997), aff'd 7th Cir. 23 May 
2001; Iwanowa v Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 
1999); Burger-Fischer v Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp.2d 248 
(D.N.J. 1999); Friedman v Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 
CV-96-5161 (E.D.N.Y. 21 October 1996). The amounts 
and numbers are enormous.
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  In North American, the amount of Native American 
lands declined from 138 million acres in 1887 to 52 
million acres in 1934. Some 26 million acres were lost 
through fraudulent transfers. (See Paul Brest and 
Miranda Oshige, ''Affirmative Action for Whom!' 47 Stan. L. 
Rev. (1995)). As early as 1851 some effort was made to 
compensate for the taking of land and the near 
extermination of many groups through the creation ol 
Native American reserves. In 1946, the federal 
government created an Indian Claims Commission witho
jurisdiction to hear and resolve claims arising from the 
seizure of Indian property and breaches by the United 
States of its treaties with the Indian nations and tribes. 
(Act of 13 August 1946, chapter 959, section 1, 60 
Stat.1049 (West 1999)). The Commission was not fully 
successful and in December 1999, a federal court 
awarded $2.5 billion in reparations for a century of trust 
fund mismanagement by the US Department of the 
Interior and Treasury. (Breast & Oshige, supra at 14). In 
addition, since 1971, the indigenous Alaskans have' ' o
received over one billion dollars and 44 million acres of 
land wrongfully seized through the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act 1971 43 U.S.C. section 1601 (1998). The 
Act was motivated by a political desire to further the 
Alaskan oil pipeline by settling indigenous land claims. 
In the non-State sector, the Methodist church 
apologized to Native Americans in Wyoming for a 1965 
post-treaty massacre led by a Methodist minister.
  In 1993, the US Congress apologised to indigenous
" o r o o
Hawaiians for the overthrow of the Hawaiian 
government by the US. (Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat.
o J ^ '
1510, 1513 0993)). In 1995, the legislature committed 
$30 million a year for 20 years to the Hawaiian 
Homelands Trust. For cases concerning Hawaiian claims 
see Office of Hawaiian Affairs v State of Hawaii, Civ. No.94- 
0205-01; Ka-ai-ai v Drake, Civ. No.92-3742-10 (1st Cir. 
1992); Kealoha v Hee, Civ. No.94-0118-1 (1st Cir.).
  As part of the millennium celebrations, Pope John Paul
II apologised for the wrongdoings of Roman Catholicsr o o o
during the past two centuries. Elsewhere, the Southern 
Baptist Convention apologised for its defence of slavery.
  The removal and relocation of more than 100,000 
Americans of Japanese ancestry during World War II has 
been the basis of half a century of litigation and lobbvingJ O J O
efforts. Executive Order 9066, calling for the relocation, 
was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 
Korematsu v United States 323 U.S.2 14 (1944). After years 
of effort to redress what was viewed as an unjust and 
unconstitutional action, in 1980 Congress established a 
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
Civilians to review the impact of the order and study the 
reparations issue under the Japanese Evacuation Claims Act, 
(Ca.814, 62 Stat. 1231 (1984)). Its report, the 
Commission found that the Executive Order wras not 
justified by military necessity and the decisions were not
driven by military conditions (see Commission on 
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, 
Personal Justice Denied, Part Two: Recommendations 
(1983)); instead, the causes were race prejudice, war 
hysteria and a failure of political leadership. As a 
response, Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act 1988, 
which required a payment of $20,000 to each survivor 
of the World War II internment camps and an official 
apology to Japanese Americans as a whole (50 U.S.C. 
section 1989b-4 (1994)).
  The German Government has paid out $60 billion to 
Holocaust victims since 1952 for state crimes; it also 
recently created a fund of $5.2 billion for acts of 
companies that used forced labor.
  African Americans were assaulted in the town of 
Rosewood, Florida in 1923 after false accusations that a 
black man had sexually assaulted a white woman. Eight 
blacks were murdered and whites from neighboringo o
towns burned all black homes. Law enforcement stood 
by and did nothing. In 1993, Florida paid $2 million to 
the survivors of the group who were driven from the 
town. A fund wras set up to compensate later claimants 
who could prove they had lost property, and a separate 
scholarship fund offered priority to Rosewood 
descendants.
  A 1921 race riot in Tulsa Oklahoma has been studied 
and on February 4, 2000, the Commission 
recommended to the state legislature that reparations be 
made to the survivors of the attacks.
  Claims for slave reparations date back to 1774 when 
Thomas Paine proposed repairing the injuries cause by 
'the wickedness of the slave trade.'(See archive of Thomas 
Paine, Thomas Paine: African Slavery in America, 
http://www.mediapro.net/cdadesign/paine/afri.html). 
Redistribution of land \vas proposed after the Civil War 
and led to the Freedmen's Bureau Act, July 16, 1866, 14 
Stat. 173 (1866), which promised 40 acres and a mule to 
each former slave. The promised reparations were 
overturned after the assassination of Lincoln and land 
given had to be returned. During the 1960s civil rights 
movement, the issue resurfaced.
  James Foreman s Black Manifesto demanded reparations 
from white churches and synagogues for their 'crimes 
against African Americans.' The manifesto asked for a 
bank, publishing and printing industries, television 
networks, a research center, a training center, a welfare
' ' O '
rights organization, a defense fund and a university. An 
African-American Representative in Congress sponsored 
a bill in Congress in 1989 to study reparations for 
African Americans and has repeated the proposal in 
every Congressional session since that time. The 
proposal has never made it out of committee.
The above claims have been dealt with largely in the 
political arena. In contrast, lawsuits for reparations for
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historic injustices have not been successful. In Cato v 
United States, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.1995) for example, 
the court rejected slave reparations. It found the existence 
of treaties between Native Americans and the United 
States to be an important factor in their reparations, 
because the treaties created relationship between nations 
and thus made the situation unique. The court also noted 
the statute of limitations and sovereign immunity as a
O J
basis for denying relief, indicating that the legislature is 
the appropriate forum to press the claim of slave 
reparations.
CRITIQUES OF REPARATIONS FOR 
HISTORIC INJUSTICES
The debate over reparations for historic injustices has 
been loud and contentious. Opponents cite to the cost, 
both in money and social upheaval. It is estimated that if 
the current 22 million African Americans took up the 
promised value of 40 acres and a mule the resulting 
compensation would probably amount to several trillion 
dollars. These arguments are similar to those that calling 
for respecting domestic amnesties for violations of human 
rights in the name of societal reconciliation. Opponents 
also claim that reparation has occurred, because modern 
civil rights laws are reparative, especially when they include 
affirmative action measures.
On a practical level, the identification of specific 
perpetrators and victims becomes much harder as time 
and distance increases. With slave reparations, for 
example, how should the classes of victim and perpetrator 
be identified   most persons are diverse in their ancestry 
and may have both slaves and slaveholders among their 
forbearers. Race is not a scientific concept and identifying 
those entitled to claim reparations on that basis could be 
particularly problematic. Some object on principle. 
Henry Hyde, a Republican Member of Congress, has 
stated:
'The notion of collective guilt for what people did (200 plus) 
years ago, that this generation should pay a debt for that 
generation, is an idea whose time has gone. I never owned a 
slave. I never oppressed anybody. I don t know that I should 
have to pay for someone who did generations bejvre I was 
born.'
(See Kevin Merida, 'Did Freedom Alone Pay a Nation's 
Debt?' Rep. John Conyers Jr. Has a Question. He's Willing to 
Wait a Long Time for the Right Answer, Washington Post, 23 
November 1999, at Cl).
Historical claims thus cannot rationally be based upon 
the paradigm of individual perpetrator, individual victim, 
and quantifiable losses; causation of present harm is 
especially difficult to show. Finally, the calculation of the 
quantum of damages is almost impossible. All these factors 
pose formidable obstacles to obtaining reparations 
through judicial action or even legislation.
Author Eric Yamamoto further argues that it is a 
mistake to think that reparations will lead to broader 
societal changes. In his view Japanese redress in US does 
not appear to have moved society more broadly towards 
racial justice or against stereotypes, and has not prevented 
other groups from being targeted as the Japanese were. 
However, it may be part of a discourse that can move the 
state to take further actions in its power in favor of new 
social arrangements that can restructure. The problem is 
to ascertain whether reparation for historic injustice will 
heal or create a sense of new injustice and a backlash by 
those who must pay, reawakening old stereotypes, old 
injuries and further inflaming mistrust and anger. (See Art 
Alcausin Hall, ''There is a Lot be Repaired Before We Get to 
Reparations: A Critique of the Underlying Issues of Race that 
Impact the Fate of African American Reparations,' 2 Scholar 1 
(2000)).
ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING REPARATIONS
Proponents of reparations point to the symbolic 
importance of apology and redress. Japanese Americans 
who were interned suffered lingering harm and bestowal 
of symbolic reparations fostered long overdue healing for 
many ' . . . a measure of dignity was restored'. (See Eric 
Yamamoto, ''Symposium: Racial Reparations: Japanese 
American Redress and African Claims', 40 Boston College L. 
Rev. 477, 478 (1998)). Another internee said 
'reparations have allowed many of us to put aside our 
bitterness and constructively reflect upon our responses 
to the internment.' (Quoted in Michael Honda, 'Japan's 
War Crimes: Has Justice Been Served?' 21 Whittier L. Rev. 
621, 622 (2000)). According to him, it succeeded in 
bringing closure in two infinitely critical ways. First, it 
stipulated to the truth that the community was innocent 
and the internment was not justified. Second, it 
recognised that the community suffered immeasurably 
and that by paying reparations the United States 
symbolically accepts the detriment the community 
suffered (ibid, at 623).
In rebutting the critique about the inability to identify 
individual victims of distant injustices, proponents argue 
that reparations are about groups, not individuals. Many 
base their claims on theories of unjust enrichment, 
contending that much of today's wealthy individuals and 
institutions obtained their riches through privilege and 
suppression, exclusion and discrimination of others.
On the positive side, proponents posit that 
reparations for historic injustices have a broader 
purpose and benefit: restructuring the institutions and 
relationships that underlie the grievance. They seek to 
address root causes not simply obtain monetary 
compensation. In international terms, they are seeking 
reconciliation and looking at social transformation. They 
argue that post-civil war reconstruction in the US failed 
precisely because no reparations were implemented. 
Without land redistribution and economic benefits,
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freedom for slaves left them without possibility of 
upward movement.
CONCLUSIONS
Reparation for historic injustice is a political and moral 
issue, but in most instances is not a legal matter. Almost no7 o
such reparations have been awarded through court action; 
instead almost all have come about through legislation oro o
executive action. Successful legal and political claims seem 
to rest on similar facts: specific and identifiable 
government acts in violation of legal norms; still living ando o 7 o
identifiable victims; identifiable perpetrators and 
identifiable injuries suffered over a fixed period of time. 
These elements were present in the cases of interned 
Japanese-Americans and the town of Rosewood (in the 
latter case there were but nine survivors and 145 
descendents of the original victims; in addition causation 
and measure of damages was relatively easy). For the 
remaining cases of historic injustices, reparation means re- 
casting what claims are legal or resting the claims on 
moral, ethical and political grounds, in order to healing 
breaches of larger social policy and repair historic 
oppression.
Can a legal claim be posited? It may be that a distinction 
between positive law and natural law, common at the time 
of slavery and earlier, could provide a foundation for 
present claims. The argument would assert that the acts 
were illegal at the time, even if not in positive law. Of 
course, in some instances   although probably not for 
slavery in the US   there would still be a problem of laches 
or stale claims. Significant in this respect is the language 
agreed to in the final declaration of the Durban World 
Conference on Racism:
Note the language of Durban:
'We acknowledge that slavery and the slave trade, including 
the transatlantic slave trade, were appalling tragedies in the 
history of humanity not only because ojtheir abhorrent 
barbarism but also in terms of their magnitude, organized 
nature and especially their negation of the essence of the 
victims, andjurther acknowledge that slavery and the slave
trade are a crime against humanity and should always have 
been so, especially the transatlantic slave trade and are 
among the major sources and manifestations of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and that 
Africans and people of African descent, Asians and people of 
Asian descent and indigenous peoples were victims of these 
acts and continue to be victims oj their consequences 
(emphasis added);
'We recognize that colonialism has led to racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and that 
Africans and people of African descent, and people of Asian 
descent and indigenous peoples were victims of colonialism 
and continue to be victims of its consequences. We 
acknowledge the suffering caused by colonialism and affirm 
that, wherever and whenever it occurred, it must be 
condemned and its reoccurrence prevented. Wejurther regret 
that the effects and persistence of these structures and 
practices have been among thejactors contributing to lasting 
social and economic inequalities in many parts oj the world 
today'.
In sum, the question of 'how far back' has no single 
answer. The circumstances of each historic injustice must 
be looked at to determine whether reparations are 
warranted and possible. In some instances neither the 
victims nor the perpetrators can be identified with any 
degree of certainty, nor can causality between the historic 
injustice and present circumstances be established. Yet, 
there are other cases where unjust enrichment is clear, 
where the immorality and even illegality of the acts at the 
time they were committed can be proven, and where 
reparation is necessary to redress the moral imbalance and 
restore the dignity and humanity of the victims. The task 
for the legal community is to identify the appropriate cases 
and provide the compelling arguments that will lead to the 
just result. @
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